| AutorIn 1: | ||||
| Pilny, Adam | ||||
| AutorIn 2: | ||||
| Rösel, Felix | ||||
| HerausgeberIn 1: | ||||
| ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München e.V. | ||||
| Titel: | ||||
| Are Doctors Better Health Ministers? | ||||
| Ort: | ||||
| München | ||||
| Verlag: | ||||
| ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München e.V. | ||||
| Jahr: | ||||
| 2020 | ||||
| Reihe: | ||||
| ifo Working Paper No. 328, 01-22 | ||||
| Abstract: | ||||
| "(...) Appointing or electing professionals to be public officials is a double-edged sword. Experts can use their
rich knowledge to implement reforms, but they can also favor their own profession. In this study, we compare
physician-trained state health ministers to ministers of other professions in Germany during 1955-2017. German
state health ministers have great power to determine hospital capacities and infrastructure. Our results show
that physiciantrained health ministers increase hospital capacities, capital, and funding by the statutory health
insurance (SHI). This prompts hospitals to hire more physicians, but with little impact on hospital outputs. As a
result, total factor productivity (TFP) growth in hospital care slows down substantially under physician-ministers.
At the same time, job satisfaction of hospital doctors tends to increase. We conclude that, in particular, the
medical profession benefits from medical doctors in office. (...)" [Hospitals, health minister, productivity, TFP, favoritism, profession, technocracy] | ||||
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